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1. Economic solubility of the agency problem with state-contingent
production
The theory of principal-agent relationships has been used to analyze a wide range of eco-
nomic problems. The most common formulation of the problem is that due to Grossman
and Hart (1983). Although Grossman and Hart demonstrated the existence of a solution
to the mathematical problem of deriving the optimal contract, there has been relatively
little analysis of the conditions under which the agency problem is soluble in an economic
sense. A situation in which the principal can do no better than to guarantee the agent a
constant payment in return for zero effort is one in which the agency problem is economi-
cally insoluble, since the cost of inducing the agent to put forth positive effort exceeds the
benefits of any feasible contract.
Haubrich (1994) presents a number of examples in which the optimal contract requires
zero effort, so that the agency problem is economically insoluble. Quiggin (2001) derives
necessary and sufficient conditions for economic solubility of the Grossman-Hart formula-
tion of the agency-cost problem and shows that economically insoluble agency problems
are likely to arise for plausible parametrizations of principal-agent relationships.
An alternative model of the moral hazard model is proposed by Quiggin and Chambers
(1998). Whereas Grossman and Hart (1983) and most other treatments of moral hazard
since Mirrlees (1974) h ave adopted a parametrized distribution formulation of the problem,
Quiggin and Chambers (1995) return to the more economically intuitive state-contingent
model. The difficulties observed with this model by Mirrlees are overcome by the use of
a more flexible representation of production under uncertainty (Chambers and Quiggin
2000). The central idea is that producers choose not only an effort vector but a state-
contingent output vector as well. Thus, for any effort bundle, a large set of state-contingent
output vectors may be feasible instead of the single state-contingent output vector the
traditional model imposes.
The object of the present note is to show that, under plausible conditions, the state-
contingent formulation of the agency problem will be economically soluble.






